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Resumo		Neste	ensaio	argumentarei	que	a	situação	atual	das	prisões	 italianas	(e,	em	geral,	 a	 dos	 países	 do	 norte	 ocidental)	 e	 as	 políticas	 criminais	 que	 as	produziram	são	o	resultado	da	 transformação	das	sociedades	democráticas	de	sociedades	inclusivas,	ou	seja,	caracterizadas	pela	progressiva	“concessão	de	 poder	 econômico	 e	 social	 aos	mais	 frágeis”,	 nas	 palavras	 de	 Du	 Bois,	 à	sociedades	 excludentes,	 caracterizadas	 pela	marginalização	 progressiva	 de	grandes	grupos	de	indivíduos,	principalmente	migrantes.	
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Abstract	In	 this	 essay	 I	will	 argue	 that	 the	 current	 situation	 of	 Italian	 prisons	 (and,	more	generally,	 those	 in	north-western	countries)	and	the	criminal	policies	that	produced	it,	are	the	result	of	the	transformation	of	democratic	societies	from	 inclusive	societies,	 that	 is,	 characterized	by	 the	progressive	«giving	of	economic	 and	 social	 power	 to	 the	 powerless»,	 in	 the	words	 of	 Du	 Bois,	 to	exclusionary	 societies,	 characterized	 by	 the	 progressive	marginalization	 of	large	groups	of	individuals,	primarily	migrants.	
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Prison	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 building	 inclusive	 democracy:	 the	 working	
citizen		Since	Michel	Foucault’s	famous	text,	Discipline	and	punish,	a	vast	historiography	has	taught	us	that	 prison,	 or	 better,	 the	 “penitentiary”,	was	 born	 and	 became	 established	 as	 a	 punitive	 tool	aimed	 at	 “reform”,	 “re-education”,	 “social	 reintegration”	 of	 the	 convicted	 person.	 And	 this	happened	at	the	same	time	as	liberal-democratic	nation	states	were	becoming	established.	Since	the	eighteenth	century,	through	the	clever	use	of	the	myth	of	the	nation	and	of	disciplining,	the	different	“peoples”	were	built,	each	understood	as	a	group	of	individuals	capable	of	using	in	an	appropriate	 way	 the	 rights	 that	 an	 increasingly	 liberal	 (and	 then	 liberal-democratic)	 state	granted	to	them.	The	democratization	of	the	nation-state,	the	extension	of	suffrage,	went	hand	in	hand	 with	 the	 disciplining	 of	 the	 people	 and	 the	 emerging	 of	 the	 myth	 of	 the	 nation.2	 The	processes	of	inclusion	in	the	nation,	that	is,	in	the	people,	and	of	disciplining,	made	it	possible	to	give	rights,	up	to	the	right	to	choose	one’s	government,	to	ever	larger	groups.		Since	the	early	nineteenth	century	European	countries,	especially	 those	of	Western	Europe,	have	 seen	 the	progressive	 social	 and	political	 inclusion	of	 the	poorest	 classes.	On	 the	political	level,	 what	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 were	 considered	 the	 dangerous	 classes	 slowly	 became,	through	 the	 extension	 of	 suffrage,	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 demos	 that	 exercised	 political	sovereignty.	 The	 ideal	 point	 of	 arrival	 of	 this	 process	 is,	 as	 Thomas	H.	Marshall	 	 (1950,	 p.	 8)	wrote	in	his	classic	work,	“citizenship”	understood	as	“a	kind	of	basic	human	equality	associated	with	the	concept	of	full	membership	of	a	community”.	The	precondition	 for	 the	development	of	democracies	has	been,	more	or	 less	explicitly,	 the	conviction	 that	 in	 the	exercise	of	 their	 rights,	 individuals	must	behave	according	 to	moral	and	rational	 principles	 (two	 adjectives	 that	 in	 the	 eighteenth-nineteenth	 century	 Enlightenment	contractualism	have	almost	synonymous	value):	“discipline”	conforms	individuals	to	the	criteria	of	 the	order	 in	which	they	are	placed.	As	Thomas	L.	Dumm	(1987,	p.	6)	pointed	out,	Alexis	de	Tocqueville	 was	 the	 first	 to	 realize	 that	 “the	 penitentiary	 system	 formed	 the	 epistemological	project	 of	 liberal	 democracy,	 creating	 conditions	 of	 knowledge	 of	 self	 and	 other	 that	were	 to	shape	the	political	subject	required	for	liberal	and	democratic	values	to	be	realized	in	practice.”	From	Tocqueville’s	analysis,	prison	and,	more	generally,	disciplinary	institutions	emerge	as	a	constitutive	element	of	the	project	of	American	liberal	democracy:	“the	American	project,	a	system	of	self-rule,	involved	not	only	the	establishment	of	representative	government	with	an	extensive	 suffrage,	 but	 also	 the	 establishment	 of	 institutions	 which	 would	 encourage	 the	internalization	of	liberal	democratic	values,	the	creation	of	individuals	who	would	learn	how	to	rule	their	selves.	(Dumm,	1987,	p.	6)	Examining	 the	 first	 democratic	 government	 that,	 transcending	 the	 urban	dimension	 that	
                                                2	 Anderson	 (2006,	 81-82)	 underlines	 the	 democratic	 and	 egalitarian	 significance	 of	 nineteenth-century	 nationalism:	 “If	‘Hungarians’	deserved	a	national	state,	then	that	meant	Hungarians,	all	of	them;	it	meant	a	state	in	which	the	ultimate	locus	of	sovereignty	 had	 to	 be	 the	 collectivity	 of	 Hungarian-speakers	 and	 readers;	 and,	 in	 due	 course,	 the	 liquidation	 of	 serfdom,	 the	promotion	of	popular	education,	the	expansion	of	the	suffrage,	and	so	on”.		
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this	 regime	had	had	 for	 centuries,	 had	 spread	 over	 a	much	 larger	 territory	 and	population,	Tocqueville	 observed	 how	 democracy	 exerts	 a	 strong	 pressure	 towards	 conformism	 and	involves	 the	 criminalization	 and	 institutionalization	 of	 the	 ‘too’	 different.	 In	 the	 nineteenth	century	United	States,	those	who	were	not	believed	to	have	the	competence	to	exercise	their	rights	were	 thrown	 back	 into	 the	 darkness	 of	 prisons	 and	 excluded	 from	 the	 possibility	 of	choosing	who	could	govern.	In	 De	 la	 démocratie	 en	 Amérique	 (1840),	 the	 rationale	 behind	 disciplinary	 institutions	emerges	 as	 a	 structural	 feature	 of	 liberal-democratic	 regimes.	 Tocqueville,	 in	 fact,	 studying	the	 first	 great	 liberal-democratic	 regime,	 affirms	 that	 the	 power	 that	 “took	 hold	 of	 bodies”,	which	 had	 guaranteed	 the	 survival	 of	 the	 absolutist	 regimes,	 was	 not	 suitable	 for	 liberal-democracies:	to	govern	these	regimes,	we	do	not	need	a	bloody	power,	but	a	power	capable	of	“taking	hold	of	souls”.	Discipline,	 that	 is	 the	system	of	practices	 that	 invests	 the	 individual’s	body	 to	 make	 it	 socially	 compatible	 and	 economically	 productive,	 is	 the	 technology	 which	expresses	this	power.	And	to	him	the	grip	on	souls,	although	less	bloody,	does	not	seem	more	limited	 and	 softer	 than	 that	 on	 bodies.	 In	 the	 chapter	 on	 the	 tyranny	 of	 the	 majority,	 the	French	philosopher	stresses	that,	paradoxical	as	 it	may	seem,	a	democratic	republic	 like	the	United	States,	which	considered	law	and	order	as	the	embodiment	of	the	people’s	will,	treated	disobedient	minorities	more	severely	than	monarchic	regimes,	which	took	no	account	of	their	subjects’	 will.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 it	 would	 therefore	 not	 be	 by	 chance	 that	 modern	disciplinary	 institutions	 originally	 developed	 in	 the	United	 States,	 that	 is,	 in	 the	 first	major	country	to	give	itself	a	republican	government.		The	origins	of	 the	modern	prison	must	be	seen	 in	 the	process	 that	began	 in	Europe	with	the	establishment	of	 the	Westphalian	system.	When	the	Western	world	appeared	as	a	space	for	competition	between	states,	the	main	problem	became	to	identify	techniques	that	would	allow	the	development	of	the	forces	of	individual	nation	states.	Enrichment	through	trade	was	expected	to	increase	the	population,	the	workforce,	production	and	export,	and	therefore	the	possibility	 of	 acquiring	 strong	 and	 numerous	 armies.	 State	 power	 became	 based	 on	 the	assumption	 that	 it	has	a	population	and	must	 intervene	on	 it,	 regulating	 the	mechanisms	of	birth	and	death,	setting	the	conditions	of	life.	Disciplinary	technologies	and	police	science	are	intended	 to	 guarantee	 the	 well-being	 of	 the	 national	 population	 and,	 through	 this,	 state	power.	A	certain	 ‘population’,	as	an	entity	distinct	 from	the	 ‘labour	force’	and	as	a	delimited	portion	 of	 the	 ‘human	 species’,	 is	 defined	 by	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 nation-state:	 it	 is	 the	policies	 that	 invest	 and	mobilize	 it	 for	 the	 achievement	 of	 state	 power	 that	 constitute	 and	identify	it.		Social	 control	 and	 criminal	 policy	 in	 particular	 were	 openly	 aimed	 at	 strengthening,	 or	creating	 if	necessary,	 individual	 responsibility.	The	weaker	 classes	were	driven	 (forced?)	 to	adapt	 to	new	social	conditions	 through	preaching	and	the	 institutional	enactment	of	virtues	capable	 of	 replacing	 the	morals	 of	 the	medieval	 society	 now	 in	 crisis.	 It	 was	 a	widespread	conviction	that	the	belief	in	free	will	and	personal	reliability,	associated	with	the	concomitant	imperative	 of	 self-discipline,	 once	 incorporated	 into	 social	 institutions	 and	 practices,	primarily	criminal	ones,	would	help	many	to	live	with	the	impersonal	conditions	of	life	in	an	urban	and	industrial	society.	
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Institutions	such	as	prisons,	schools,	hospitals,	etc.,	promised	to	recreate	order,	substituting	discipline	for	traditional	systems	of	social	control,	which	had	been	swept	away	by	the	industrial	revolution	 and	 the	 development	 of	 suburbs.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 new	 institutions	 made	 it	possible	 to	conceptualize	crime	 in	 irreducibly	 individual	 terms.	That	 they	were	 the	solution	 to	the	problems	of	 crime	meant	 that	 this	was	not	 a	 collective	 social	 disobedience	 resulting	 from	famine	and	poverty	driving	whole	masses	of	individuals	to	commit	various	types	of	offences,	but	an	entirely	personal	 loss	 in	sin	and	error.	The	 fascination	of	 institutional	 solutions	 lay	 in	 their	promising	to	restore	order	and	at	the	same	time	in	their	strictly	individualistic	interpretation	of	crime.	The	key	idea	was	that	for	every	offender	punishment	should	consist	primarily	in	the	duty	to	 face	 the	 tragedy	 of	 guilt:	 the	 detainee	 should	 live	 the	 tragedy	 of	 suffering,	 repentance,	reflection	and	amendment,	under	the	tutelary	control	of	the	chaplain.		In	this	context,	prison,	or	rather	the	penitentiary,	was	the	institution	that	seemed	capable	of	reconciling	the	rhetoric	of	punishment	with	that	of	 its	execution.	The	penalty	of	deprivation	of	liberty,	on	its	appearance,	brought	about	a	revolutionary	reversal	in	the	practice	of	punishment,	a	reversal	 that	was	 in	 tune,	 if	 not	with	 the	 letter	 of	 Enlightenment	 theories,	 at	 least	with	 their	inspiring	 values.	 Prison	 turned	 the	 strategy	 of	 social	 defence	 upside	 down:	 it	 went	 from	conceiving	the	offender	as	a	person	to	be	annihilated	to	the	 idea	that	he	remained,	despite	his	violation	 of	 the	 rules,	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 society,	 so	 that	 punishment	 should	 be	 aimed	 at	 his	reintegration	into	the	social	context.	This	crucial	function	of	the	penitentiary	became	the	pivot	of	the	strategy	of	social	control	with	the	rise	of	the	capitalist	production	system.	At	the	time	of	the	‘original	accumulation’	and	the	enclosures,	 the	penitentiary	 institutions	seemed	to	be	 the	right	tool	 to	 transform	 the	 masses	 of	 former	 peasants	 immigrating	 to	 the	 cities	 into	 industrial	workmen.	As	Georg	Rusche	and	Otto	Kirchheimer	(1939)	have	famously	shown,	the	penitentiary	emerged	as	a	place	of	forced	socialization	and	was	structured	on	the	productive	model,	 first	of	manufacture	 and	 then	 of	 the	 factory,	 from	 which	 it	 borrowed	 its	 internal	 organization.	 The	penitentiary	 is	 the	 place	 where	 the	 liberal	 rhetoric	 of	 punishment,	 understood	 as	 the	 forced	deprivation	of	a	predetermined	quantum	of	freedom,	and	that	of	its	execution	are	compound.	It	is	the	place	where	the	contract	is	combined	with	discipline,	retribution	and	re-education.	Thanks	to	the	characteristics	of	the	penitentiary,	in	other	words,	the	prison	sentence	proves	capable,	on	the	one	 hand,	 of	 subjecting	 the	 destructiveness	 of	 punishment	 to	 the	 contractual	 standard	 (the	principle	of	retribution),	and,	on	the	other,	of	making	punishment	serve	the	productive	process	(the	principle	of	re-education).	(Cf.	Pavarini,	1980,	p.	67)	The	penitentiary	is,	therefore,	the	place,	theoretical	and	physical,	that	allows	the	full	deployment	of	the	liberal	theory	of	punishment.	For	this	theory	the	best	social	defence	is	for	the	transgressor	–	defaulting	contractor	–	to	compensate	the	damage	caused	to	society,	paying	with	his	own	time	and	simultaneously	subjecting	himself,	while	serving	the	sentence,	to	discipline.	Only	in	this	way	can	the	offender	be	reintegrated	into	the	fabric	of	legal	relations	as	a	docile	subject,	no	longer	aggressor	of	property,	but	ready	to	sell	his	workforce	on	the	market	to	support	himself.	(Costa,	1974,	p.	357-78)				
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The	crisis	of	work	ethics:	the	end	of	the	idea	of	work	integration		Thus,	 throughout	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 and	much	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	work	 and	 its	ethics	 were	 the	 connective	 tissue	 of	 disciplinary	 techniques,	 they	 represented	 the	 integrative	mechanism	of	 society	 and	 therefore	 the	 tool	 of	 social	 reintegration.	 This	 role,	 indeed	 strongly	questioned	 during	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 has	 been	 finally	 lost	 with	globalization.	 As	 Bauman	 (1998)	 pointed	 out,	 the	 ultimate	 reason	 for	 the	 crisis	 of	 the	 re-educational	conception	of	punishment	and	its	reconceptualization	in	purely	containing	terms	is	the	loss	of	centrality	of	work	ethics.		Efforts	to	reintegrate	prisoners	into	the	labour	market	only	make	sense	if	there	is	availability,	or	rather	‘hunger’,	of	jobs.	In	the	nineteenth	century,	entrepreneurs	were	eager	to	invest	capital	in	new	industrial	production	ready	to	absorb	increasing	amounts	of	labour	force.	Today,	on	the	contrary,	the	stock	exchanges	reward	companies	that	cut	the	number	of	jobs.	In	these	conditions	it	makes	no	sense	 to	 try	 to	bring	 the	often	reluctant	 categories	of	 the	 ‘without	a	boss’	back	 to	work.	In	these	conditions,	detention	can	hardly	lay	claim	to	its	social	rationality	as	a	school	for	starting	 work,	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 second-best	 mode,	 imposed	 by	 force,	 to	 increase	 the	 ranks	 of	productive	labour	in	social	sectors	that	prove	impermeable	to	voluntary	recruitment,	as	was	the	case	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 The	 problem	 today	 seems	 to	 arise	 in	 exactly	 opposite	 terms:	companies	are	mostly	committed	to	getting	rid	of	superfluous	workers,	for	whom	there	are	no	job	opportunities	 and	no	point	 in	 retraining,	 and	 the	only	 concern	 is	 to	mitigate	 the	 threat	 to	social	stability	posed	by	the	unemployed	masses.	Moreover,	when	labour	is	needed,	recourse	can	be	had	to	the	inexhaustible	basin	of	immigration,	which	provides	cheap,	self-disciplined	and,	in	some	cases,	already	highly	qualified	workers.	This	does	not	mean	that	any	ethical	emphasis	on	work	has	disappeared;	rather,	it	means	that	work	ethics	has	ceased	to	be	a	pillar	of	the	social	order	as	it	has	been	for	over	three	centuries	and	has	left	behind	a	contradictory	cultural	context.	Today	individuals	are	supposed	to	observe	work	ethics	in	an	unfavourable	context:	its	development	is	a	purely	private	and	almost	ascetic	exercise.	Within	global	markets,	 it	 is	above	all	 ‘external	objective	conditions’	which,	by	determining	 the	productivity	of	an	 investment,	decide	 the	 location	of	an	entrepreneurial	activity.	Labour	ethics	does	not	guarantee	access	to	work,	nor	does	it	promote	stability	in	employment,	once	obtained.	If	the	conditions	of	infrastructures	and	services,	the	level	of	taxation,	the	cost	of	labour,	typical	of	a	certain	area,	make	it	more	profitable	for	entrepreneurs	to	invest	elsewhere,	work	ethics,	whether	developed	autonomously	by	individuals	or	imposed	by	panoptic	institutions,	is	no	guarantee	of	job	placement.	The	link	between	ascetic	discipline	and	worldly	success,	which	Smith	took	as	the	basis	of	the	social	order	and	Weber	considered	as	the	main	characteristic	of	the	early	capitalist	ethic,	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 dissolved.	 Society	 continues	 to	 demand	 rigour	 and	 discipline	 from	those	who	work	or	prepare	for	work,	but	is	no	longer	able	to	ensure	any	success	for	those	who	are	 capable	of	 self-discipline.	This	new	picture	 could	not	but	have	 consequences	also	on	 ‘total	institutions’:	 they	 are	 less	 and	 less	 disciplinary	 institutions	 and	 more	 and	 more	 containing	institutions.	 If	 inculcating	 work	 ethics	 does	 not	 guarantee	 any	 job	 placement,	 even	 the	 last	tenuous	 hopes	 of	 punishment's	 ability	 to	 ‘re-educate	 individuals’	 and	 reduce	 recidivism	
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disappear.	Economically,	there	is	no	longer	any	point	in	investing	in	‘re-socialising’	institutions.	It	is	much	more	convenient	to	devote	resources	to	improving	the	containing	aspects	of	institutions,	their	 security.	 This	 ensures	 at	 least	 that,	while	 serving	 the	 sentence,	 ‘criminals’	will	 not	 cause	new	damage.	In	this	context,	prison	institutions	are	being	developed	that	are	‘panoptic’	from	a	technological	point	of	view,	being	based	on	the	idea	of	continuous	surveillance,	but	are	very	far	from	the	spirit	of	Bentham’s	project,	since	they	have	no	disciplinary	purpose,	they	are	not	absolutely	aimed	at	developing	 work	 ethics,	 at	 building	 the	 ‘docile	 body’	 to	 be	 employed	 nor	 at	 the	 productive	reintegration	 of	 the	 prisoner.	 They	 aim	 exclusively	 at	 guaranteeing	 the	maximum	 security	 of	imprisonment.		
Prison	and	welfare	state		Thus,	 the	welfare	 state	apparatus	was	born	out	of	 the	 conviction	 that	each	state	must	 take	charge	 of	 managing	 its	 own	 population,	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 its	 well-being	 and	 so	 increase	 its	economic	and	military	power.	Prison	in	this	context	was	the	tool	to	try	to	regain	those	living	on	the	margins	of	society	through	crimes	and	expedients	to	the	cause	of	State	power,	transforming	them	into	productive	citizens.	After	World	War	II,	the	military	power	of	Western	European	states	became	progressively	less	important	 (initially	with	 the	partial	exception	of	France	and	Great	Britain),	 since	 the	collective	defence	of	Western	Europe	was	entrusted	to	NATO	and	ultimately	to	the	United	States.	But	the	economic	competition	between	states	(in	addition,	of	course,	 to	pressure	 from	socialist	parties	and	the	trade	union	movement)	still	pushes	them	to	be	concerned	about	their	people’s	welfare.	The	 development	 of	welfarist	 policies	 peaked	 in	 the	 1970s,	when	 Keynesianism	 and	 Fordism	were	combined.		For	 over	 a	 hundred	 years	 the	 two	 locomotives	 –	 ‘discipline’	 and	market	 –	 ran	 on	 parallel	tracks,	favouring	the	state’s	development.	In	the	first	phase	the	economy	seemed	to	need	above	all	 disciplined	 workforce,	 so	 that	 the	 developments	 of	 market	 and	 discipline	 seemed,	 as	 in	Bentham’s	design,	perfectly	symbiotic.	When	it	turned	out	that	this	synergy	was	an	illusion	and	that	 disciplining	 the	 labour	 force	 often	 did	 not	 meet	 market	 needs,	 welfarist	 policies	 were	complemented	 by	 the	 Fordist	 ones.	 This	 was	 a	 complete	 reversal	 of	 the	 eighteenth-century	Smithian	 idea	 that	 poverty,	 by	 activating	 human	 resources,	 is	 a	 key	 element	 in	 stimulating	economic	growth.	The	Fordist	approach	shifts	focus	from	the	labour	market	to	the	goods	market,	assuming	 that	 it	 is	 wealth,	 and	 not	 poverty,	 that	 represents	 the	 fundamental	 stimulus	 for	economic	 growth,	 because	 only	 wealth	 is	 able	 to	 produce	 consumption	 and	 therefore	 to	stimulate	 the	 demand	 that	 activates	 production.	 The	 eighteenth	 century	 approach,	 in	 its	Smithian,	 Malthusian	 and	 Benthamian	 versions,	 was	 linked	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 only	 limit	 to	production	was	the	lack	of	manpower.	If	there	had	been	manpower,	wealth	could	have	increased	indefinitely.	The	Fordist	 thesis	 instead	 takes	 into	 account	 the	overproduction	 crisis	of	 the	 late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries,	that	is,	the	fact	that	without	demand	production	does	not	 generate	 wealth.	 It	 was	 clear	 by	 then	 that	 the	 problem	 was	 not	 so	 much	 a	 scarcity	 of	
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producers,	 as	 Bentham	 and	 Smith	 thought,	 but	 of	 consumers.	 And	 full	 employment	 and	 the	progressive	growth	of	workers’	wages	were	seen	as	 the	elements	 to	create	an	ever-expanding	market.	The	most	 significant	 aspect	 of	 Fordist	 policies,	 however,	 is	 an	 assumption	 that	 often	 goes	unnoticed:	they	finally	accept	that	labour	and	its	market	cannot	play	the	role	of	the	driving	force	behind	 the	 integration	of	 society.	Underlying	Fordism	 is	 an	awareness	 that	 the	worker-citizen	equation	could	no	 longer	perform	the	function	of	 lintel	of	 the	social	order:	full	 integration	into	the	labour	market	no	longer	seems	in	itself	a	sufficient	basis	to	guarantee	full	participation	in	the	social	 and	 political	 life	 of	 the	 community.	 Between	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 and	 early	 twentieth	century	this	idea	was	already	the	foundation	of	the	development	of	Welfarist	policies,	which	are	not	by	chance	contemporary	to	the	birth	of	sociology.		Instead,	 with	 Fordism	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 the	 core	 of	 the	 social	 order	 cannot	 be	 an	individual	who	finds	the	meaning	of	his	existence	in	his	work	(which	may	consist	in	one	of	the	seventeen	operations	necessary	 to	produce	a	pin).	 (Smith,	1776)	 In	his	place	 there	emerges	a	‘consumerist’	individual,	driven	by	the	awareness	of	the	often	alienating	character	of	his	work	to	seek	 the	meaning	 of	 life	 in	 consumption.	 This	 compensation	 for	 the	 ‘miseries’	 of	 work	 is	 the	implicit	 promise	 of	 Fordist	 policies,	 based	on	 full	 employment	 guaranteed	by	 sufficiently	 high	wages,	 such	as	 to	 allow	employees	 to	be	 consumers	of	 a	 certain	 importance	on	 the	market	of	goods,	 including	discretionary	goods,	and	therefore	able	to	 fuel	a	significant	demand	for	goods	and	services.	It	is	natural	that,	in	parallel	with	this	transformation,	the	penal	system	should	change	from	a	tool	 for	 creating	 responsible	 individuals	 to	 a	 tool	 for	 creating	 social	 consumers.	 This	transformation	 is	 marked	 by	 the	 progressive	 shift	 of	 the	 causal	 origin	 of	 crime	 from	 an	individual’s	free	moral	choice	to	his	more	or	less	pathological	condition.	(Cf.	Garland,	1990)	With	the	 emergence	 of	 the	 social	 paradigm,	 the	 privileged	mode	 of	 social	 regulation	 changes	 from	general	deterrence	to	strategies	of	prevention,	rehabilitation,	re-education	or	re-socialisation	of	deviants.	As	 the	state,	 in	order	 to	allocate	 social	 rights,	 shatters	 the	unity	of	 the	citizen	status,	which	characterized	the	classical	liberal	theory,	and	differentiates	individuals	according	to	their	needs,	 creating	 the	 categories	 of	 ‘women’,	 ‘unemployed’,	 ‘pensioners’,	 etc.,	 so	 its	 penal	 system	shatters	 the	 category	 of	 the	 offender.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 deviant	 individuals’	 needs,	 the	 punitive	system	of	the	welfare	state	has	built	the	categories	of	the	‘incapable’,	the	‘habitual	criminals’,	the	‘moral	fools’	(later	transformed	into	‘psychopaths’),	the	drug	addicts,	the	AIDS	patients,	the	social	misfits,	a	whole	series	of	figures	traceable	to	social	deprivation,	etc.,	and	has	tried	to	differentiate	punitive	answers	so	as	to	give	each	one	an	appropriate	treatment.		
The	welfare	crisis	and	the	end	of	re-education		This	new	technique	of	governance	quickly	run	into	a	crisis	because	consumption	soon	began	to	 appear	 by	 its	 very	nature	 a	 social	 control	 tool	 difficult	 to	manage.	 In	 the	 1970s,	 the	 state’s	ability	to	finance	social	services	seemed	to	run	into	a	crisis,	and	the	so-called	“fiscal	crisis	of	the	
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state”	 (O’Connor,	 1973)3	 broke	 out.	 The	 increase	 in	 state	 deficits	 seemed	 to	 impose	 a	 drastic	rethinking	of	Keynesian	policies	and	a	substantial	tightening	of	social	spending.	In	fact,	as	Albert	Hirschman	 (1991)	 pointed	 out,	 the	 crisis	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 is	 not	 a	 consequence	 of	 fiscal	problems:	 the	 sudden	discovery	of	 the	 inefficiency	of	 its	 structures	was	but	an	 indication	 that	their	underlying	political	project	appeared	unsustainable.	Disciplinary	technologies	were	widely	perceived	 as	 not	 capable	 of	 managing	 consumer-based	 integration.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	standardisation	 of	 needs	 that	 they	 brought	 about	 began	 to	 be	 perceived	 as	 a	 limitation	 of	individual	freedom	and	a	paternalistic	interference.	On	the	other	hand,	this	same	standardization	proves	 incapable	 of	 controlling	 the	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 multiplication	 of	 social	consumption	 (a	multiplication	reinforced	by	 the	vast	migratory	phenomena	 that	have	affected	north-western	countries).	Disciplinary	technologies	have	lost	their	overall	meaning:	the	type	of	subject	 they	 favour,	 instead	 of	 being	 functional	 to	 the	 social	 order,	 seems	 to	 contribute	 to	undermining	it,	overloading	it	with	demands	that	it	cannot	cope	with.		The	 crisis	of	 the	welfare	 system	gradually	deprives	 the	various	disciplinary	 technologies	of	their	reference	system.	At	this	point,	the	re-socializing	prison,	the	prison	of	inclusive	democracy,	begins	to	run	into	a	crisis	because	it	finds	itself	without	a	compass;	it	no	longer	has	a	model	of	“social	reintegration”	to	guide	it.	The	model	of	the	working	individual,	a	rational	actor	capable	of	deferring	satisfaction	over	time,	has	lost	all	credibility,	and	the	model	of	the	“consumer”	citizen	has	itself	suddenly	appeared	implausible.	This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 punitive	 systems	have	 lost	 all	 of	 their	 re-socializing	 connotations.	Even	in	the	criminal	field,	the	crisis	of	the	welfare	state,	as	Stanley	Cohen	(1985)	pointed	out,	has	not	led	to	the	dismantling	of	the	apparatus	of	normalization,	investigation,	individualization	and	classification	developed	in	previous	decades.	Disciplinary	techniques	still	have	a	certain	degree	of	 local	 efficiency	 and	 an	 enduring	 ability	 to	 deal	with	 immediate	 problems,	 at	 least	 for	 some	individuals,	 and	 are	 therefore	 not	 eliminated.	 It	 is	 indeed	 unthinkable	 that	 a	 system	 of	 social	control	should	eliminate	its	structures,	without	a	new	one	having	taken	its	place.	Of	course,	with	the	outbreak	of	the	“fiscal	crisis	of	the	State”,	the	investments	destined	to	the	non-immediately	repressive	treatment	of	deviants	are	the	first	to	be	axed	by	expenditure	containment.	In	times	of	lack	of	resources,	offenders	are	those	who	‘deserve’	to	be	helped	less	than	any	other.4	According	to	 Roger	Matthews	 (2002)	 we	 are	 living	 a	 phase	 of	 trans-incarceration.5	 The	 agencies	 of	 the	welfare	 state	 (medical,	 educational,	 social	 institutions)	 that	 take	 charge	 of	 the	 marginal	
                                                3	The	book	was	anticipated	by	an	article	with	the	same	title	that	appeared	in	the	journal	Socialist	Revolution.	James	O’Connor	(1973,	p.	10)	saw	the	problem	of	consumption-based	social	integration	from	a	Marxist	perspective.	He	pointed	out	that	the	modern	capitalist	State	had	to	“carry	out	two	fundamental	and	often	contradictory	functions”:	1)	ensure	the	formation	of	capital,	that	is,	 investment	flows	 (the	 “accumulation	 function”	 of	 the	 State);	 2)	 safeguard	 its	 own	 legitimacy	 by	 guaranteeing	 appropriate	 standards	 of	consumption,	health	and	education	(the	“legitimation	function”	of	the	State).	These	two	contradictory	requirements	generate,	in	his	view,	 budget	 deficits,	 inflation	 and	 fiscal	 revolt,	 and	 this	 leads	 him	 to	 argue	 that	 “the	 accumulation	 of	 social	 capital	 and	 social	expenditure	 is	 a	 highly	 irrational	 process	 in	 terms	 of	 administrative	 coherence,	 fiscal	 stability	 and	 potentially	 profitable	 private	accumulation”	(1973,	p.	15).	O’Connor’s	views	were	taken	up	in	1975	by	Samuel	Huntington,	who	wrote	the	chapter	on	the	United	States	of	the	famous	report	to	the	Trilateral	Commission	(drafted,	besides	Huntington,	by	Crozier	and	Watanuki),	entitled	The	Crisis	of	
Democracy:	Report	on	the	Governability	of	Democracies	to	the	Trilateral	Commission	(1975).	Read	from	the	right,	the	crisis	identified	by	O’Connor	is	not	a	crisis	of	capitalism,	an	economic	crisis,	but	a	crisis	of	an	essentially	political	nature.	Huntington	(1975,	p.	73)	sees	the	“welfare	turn”	as	the	main	culprit	of	the	“crisis	of	democracy”:	the	United	States	and	the	other	Western	democracies	risked,	in	his	view,	becoming	“ungovernable”,	under	the	weight	of	the	“overload”	of	demands	from	their	people.	4	On	the	rhetorical	use	of	the	‘fiscal	crisis’	of	the	state	and	then	of	the	‘overload	crisis	of	democracy’,	see	Hirschman	(1991).	5	See	also	Matthews	and	Francis	(1996).	
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population	have	changed	their	soul:	originally	in	charge	of	providing	services,	today	they	operate	mainly	as	links	in	the	prison	chain.	As	Foucault	had	pointed	out,	and	then	Cohen	reiterated,	the	institutions	of	post-prison	social	control	have	always	been	closely	related	 to	prison,	straddling	the	boundary	between	assistance	and	repression.	With	the	crisis	of	welfare	as	a	plausible	basis	of	the	social	and	political	order,	however,	the	institutional	focus	seems	to	shift	decisively:	the	aim	of	institutions	is	no	longer	treatment	(disciplining),	but	mere	incapacitation,	the	delimitation	of	the	possibility	to	act,	to	move,	of	the	individuals	taken	in	charge.		
Globalization	 and	exclusive	democracy:	Prison	 as	 an	 instrument	of	
the	dictatorship	of	a	frightened	class		The	 lack	 of	 a	model	 of	 ‘citizen	 to	 produce’	 is	 a	 traumatic	 factor	 for	 the	 political	 and	 social	order.	Without	a	guiding	model,	all	the	‘disciplines’	that	have	allowed	the	preservation	of	order	in	the	modern	era	come	into	crisis.	As	Foucault	(1994,	p.	39)	observes,	the	crisis	of	the	‘disciplines’	«calls	knowledge	into	question,	the	form	of	knowledge,	the	‘subject-object’	norm;	it	questions	the	relations	between	our	society’s	economic	and	political	structures	and	knowledge	(not	in	its	true	and	 untrue	 contents	 but	 in	 its	 ‘power-knowledge’	 functions)».	 We	 are	 therefore	 facing	 “a	historical	 political	 crisis”.	 In	 this	 context,	 prison	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 disciplinary	 institution	 that	managed	 to	 immediately	 redesign	 its	 function:	 it	 transformed	 itself	 by	 adapting	 to	 the	 crisis	while	retaining	its	role	as	a	fundamental	bulwark	of	order.	The	 spread	 of	 major	 migratory	 phenomena	 has	 meant	 that	 in	 recent	 years	 the	 political	function	required	of	prison	has	completely	changed.	It	is	no	longer	called	upon	to	produce	‘good	citizens’	whose	judgement	and	behaviour	can	be	trusted,	but	to	protect	the	welfare	state,	whose	decline	is	allegedly	irreversible,	for	those	accustomed	to	using	it.	It	is	called	upon	to	set	the	limits	of	social	citizenship,	to	raise	barriers	defining	the	universe	of	‘consumer	citizens’.	And	prison	has	promptly	taken	on	this	demand.	With	the	great	migrations	that	have	affected	north-western	countries	in	the	last	few	decades	(the	United	States	for	much	longer),	the	notion	of	population	has	changed	substantially:	it	is	no	longer	a	predefined	set	of	individuals	to	intervene	on	by	regulating	birth	or	death.	It	has	become	a	set	that	can	be	continuously	redefined	through	receiving	migrants	and	expelling	residents.	This	change	overturns	the	foundations	of	the	modern	state,	but	at	the	same	time	offers	a	solution,	at	least	contingent,	 to	 the	problem	of	order.	Thanks	 to	migration,	 the	population’s	manipulability	has	increased	disproportionately.	A	state	can	select	its	own	population	much	more	easily:	it	can	build,	through	a	series	of	inclusive	and	excluding	mechanisms,	a	population	of	all	actors	capable	of	 staying	 on	 the	 market,	 without	 the	 need	 to	 ‘re-educate’	 the	 members	 of	 its	 supposedly	predetermined	population	who	prove	incapable	of	doing	so.	This	possibility	mitigates	the	impact	of	the	lack	of	a	model	citizen	to	be	produced.	In	fact,	it	is	no	longer	necessary	to	produce	‘good’	citizens:	it	is	enough	to	enable	the	market	to	select	useful	individuals.	Individuals	are	placed	in	society	in	a	condition	of	great	weakness.	Then,	their	interaction	with	society	itself	is	monitored:	if	they	create	too	many	problems	they	are	ousted.	The	lack	of	a	model	of	citizen	to	produce,	and	the	inability	to	produce	it,	make	social	inclusion	experimental:	every	experiment	must	be	controlled.	
Santoro	I	Steps	toward	an	exclusive	democracy 
Revista	de	Estudos	Constitucionais,	Hermenêutica	e	Teoria	do	Direito	(RECHTD),	11(2):130-142 139 
Only	those	who	succeed	in	entering	market	mechanisms,	and	only	as	long	as	they	succeed,	are	admitted	to	the	population.	At	the	same	time	the	perception,	induced	by	the	ideology	of	globalization,	that	the	resources	the	state	can	use	for	social	purposes	are	inevitably	scarce	has	spread	the	belief	that	the	rights	of	‘autochthonous’	 majorities	 can	 only	 be	 guaranteed	 through	 the	 exclusion	 of	 migrant	 subjects	(and	 often	 also	 of	 ‘undeserving’	 citizens)	 from	 these	 rights.	 In	 north-western	 countries,	 the	criminalization	 of	 migrants	 has	 become	 one	 of	 the	 main	 flags	 of	 the	 reunification	 of	 society	(Melossi,	2002,	p.	259):	a	reunification	carried	out	at	the	expense	of	migrants	themselves,	who	are	used	as	resources	of	the	productive	system	and	at	the	same	time	excluded	from	welfare	and	social	 security	 circuits.	 The	majority	 of	 public	 opinion	 in	north-western	 countries	 could	never	accept	that	access	to	citizenship	rights	be	regulated	by	xenophobic	or	racist	criteria.	They	would	never	 accept,	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 idea	 that	 migrants	 should	 be	 excluded	 from	 social	 rights	because	of	their	black	or	yellow	skin,	or	of	their	 ‘uncivilised’	practices.	Nor	would	it	be	easy	to	accept	 a	 purely	 selfish	 perspective	 (with	 some	 slavery	 vein):	 we	 have	 few	 resources	 and	therefore	migrants	cannot	expect	us	to	give	up	our	pensions,	our	ability	to	care	for	ourselves	–	which	 are	 already	 in	 danger	 –	 to	 allow	 them	 an	 acceptable	 level	 of	 social	 security.	 Such	approaches	only	resonate	with	some	minority,	and	often	exasperated,	sectors	of	north-western	public	 opinion.	 Instead,	 linking	 access	 to	 citizenship	 rights	 to	 law	 abidance	 seems	 aseptic	 and	politically	correct:	we	cannot	show	solidarity	with	 those	who	commit	crimes	and	attack,	often	violently,	our	people	and	goods.	In	largely	anonymous	societies,	the	distinction	between	the	honest	citizen	and	the	‘criminal’	does	 not	 depend	 so	 much	 on	 the	 criminal	 conviction	 as	 on	 the	 prison	 sentence.	 The	criminalisation	of	foreigners	could	not	therefore	stand	without	a	high	rate	of	imprisonment.	This	use	of	detention	marks	a	major	break	in	prison	history.	Given	the	unlimited	possibility	of	recruiting	manpower	provided	by	migration	and	the	obsession	with	the	scarcity	of	resources	to	use	 for	 social	purposes,	 today’s	 society	has	decided	not	 to	 grant	offenders	 a	 second	 chance	of	social	life.	As	the	prison	loses	its	resocialization	purpose,	the	detention	of	migrants	is	deprived	of	any	 meaning	 other	 than	 to	 stigmatize	 them	 as	 ‘dangerous’	 individuals.	 While	 for	 Italian	 (or	European)	 citizens	 there	 is	 no	 ‘elsewhere’	where	 they	 can	be	placed,	 for	migrants	 ‘elsewhere’	there	is.	The	hunger	for	manpower	of	nineteenth	century	industrialization	having	disappeared,	due	 to	 changed	production	methods	and	migratory	phenomena,	 there	are	no	more	 reasons	 to	keep	 deviant	 migrants	 within	 the	 state	 political	 space.	 In	 addition,	 the	 disappearance	 of	 any	guiding	model	 of	 their	 social	 reintegration	makes	 it	 not	 even	 conceivable	 that	 they	might	 be	‘disciplined’.	In	the	past	criminal	policy	had	been	forced	to	choose	between	physical	suppression	and	the	need	to	make	the	offender	harmless,	either	through	deterrence	or	through	re-education	(or	disciplining).	Now	it	regains	a	dimension	that	had	been	lost	after	the	late	eighteenth	century	failed	attempts	at	deportation,	and	was	unknown	to	the	penality	of	the	last	century:	the	expulsion	of	deviants	from	political	space.	Expulsion	 from	 political	 space,	 however,	 can	 also	 consist	 in	 a	 simple	 marginalization	 of	migrants	 from	 the	 sphere	 of	 legality.	 If,	 as	 Foucault	 (1994,	 p.	 35)	writes,	 “the	 prison	 form	 of	penality	corresponds	to	the	wage	form	of	labor”,	perhaps	we	can	also	say	that	the	precariousness	form	(or	the	‘McDonaldization’)	of	labour	corresponds	to	the	marginalisation	form	of	at	least	part	
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of	 penality:	 in	 fact,	 it	 is	 the	 existence	 of	 this	 area	 of	 intra-state	 marginality	 that	 serves	 as	 a	laboratory	to	test	prospective	citizens.	The	typical	path	of	migrants	in	Italy	is	characterized	by	a	period	 of	 irregularity	 and	marginality	 in	which	 they	 are	 tested:	 those	who	 prove	 to	 be	 ‘good	citizens’,	 that	 is,	 who	 accept	 to	 live	 without	 guarantees,	 without	 rights	 and	 in	 total	precariousness,	 without	 disturbing,	 are	 admitted	 to	 the	 rank	 of	 ‘regular’.	 Marginalisation	 is	therefore	 institutionally	created	in	the	national	territory:6	 it	becomes	an	organised	social	zone,	on	the	one	hand,	for	use	as	a	tool	of	migration	governance	and,	on	the	other,	for	the	management	of	certain	population	groups	considered	unworthy	of	social	citizenship.	This	 situation	 is	 not	 surprising:	 the	new	 criminal	 policies	 only	 reflect	 the	 sclerosis	 of	what	Peter	 Glotz	 (1985)	 has	 called	 “the	 two-thirds	 society”,	 a	 society	 in	 which	 a	 significant	 but	minority	 share	 of	 individuals	 is	 excluded	 from	 well-being	 and	 the	 political	 tools	 needed	 to	achieve	 it.	 Opulent	 democracies	 have	 turned	 into	 dictatorships	 of	 a	 frightened	 class:	 what	interests	the	European	middle	classes,	who	have	become	the	majority	thanks	to	welfare	policies,	is	 to	 prevent	 indiscriminate	 access	 to	 citizenship	 rights	 from	 considerably	 reducing	 their	traditional	 social	 guarantees.	 After	 the	 vanishing	 of	 the	 Fordist	 and	welfarist	 narrative,	which	promised	 a	 positive	 sum	 development	 of	well-being	whereby	 the	 improved	 conditions	 of	 the	weakest	sections	of	the	population	would	lead	to	the	improvement	of	everyone’s	conditions,	the	citizens	of	European	countries	have	come	to	believe	that	social	rights	are	a	zero	sum	game.	They	fear	 that	 extending	 welfare	 benefits	 will	 worsen	 the	 reduction	 of	 their	 benefits,	 already	underway	as	a	result	of	the	phenomena	of	economic	and	financial	globalization.	For	this	reason,	they	entrust	prison	with	the	role	of	legitimizing	the	exclusion,	first	of	all,	of	migrants,	but	also	of	all	 those	who	 seem	undeserving.	 This	 has	 created	 a	mass	 of	 economically	 and	politically	 very	weak	subjects,	excluded	from	the	effective	enjoyment	of	almost	all	rights.	An	underclass,7	a	more	or	less	extensive	social	subclass,	often	also	ethnically	characterised,	is	denied	legitimate	access	to	available	economic	and	social	resources	and	is	represented	as	dangerous,	perceived	as	a	threat	to	social	security	and,	as	a	result	of	its	exclusion,	to	the	security	of	citizens’	life	and	property.	The	key	to	understanding	the	new	criminal	policies	is,	indeed,	a	reflexive	dynamic	whereby	the	strategies	of	 controlling	 marginalization	 produce	 control-generated	 marginalisation.	 Lemert’s	 teaching	seems	to	have	been	fully	understood,	not	as	a	reason	to	doubt	criminalization	policies	but	as	a	strategy	for	producing	 legitimacy.	The	social	construction	of	 the	 ‘marginal’	as	 ‘dangerous’	ends	up	accentuating	his	 real	dangerousness,	and	 therefore	 legitimising	new	strategies	of	excluding	and	criminalizing	classes	of	marginal	individuals.	From	 a	 sociological	 point	 of	 view,	 it	 must	 be	 recognised	 that	 north-western	 democratic	citizens	 have	 always	 feared	 crime	 and	 encouraged	 politicians	 to	 adopt	 repressive	 laws.	Protecting	the	fundamental	rights	of	those	recognised	as	deviants	has	always	been	the	heritage	of	an	expert	and	enlightened	knowledge	which,	in	particular	sectors	of	the	political	world	and	the	
                                                6	 In	 fact,	 there	also	seems	to	be	a	marginalisation	 that	 is	 functional	 to	 illegal	markets.	This	 is	clear	 from	the	stubborn	 issuance	of	expulsion	orders	against	foreigners	whose	effective	deportation	is	known	to	be	impossible.	All	these	people	end	up	in	a	sort	of	black	well:	they	will	not	comply	with	the	expulsion	order	but	this	order	will	force	them	to	live	as	irregular	immigrants	and	to	rely,	willingly	or	unwillingly,	on	the	illegal	market.		7	The	notion	of	underclass	has	been	placed	at	the	centre	of	recent	criminological	debate	by	Wilson	(1987).	However,	it	has	illustrious	ancestors	such	as	the	theory	of	differential	associations	of	Sutherland	(1924),	the	ecological	theory	of	social	disorganization	of	Shaw	and	McKay	(1942)	and	the	theories	of	cultural	conflict.	
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administration,	 has	 been	 opposed	 to	 the	 punitive	 impulse	 (which	 has	 always	 shown	 up	with	particular	 force	 in	 the	 face	of	serious	criminal	acts).	The	crisis	of	 the	 ‘citizen-consumer’	model	has	undermined	the	credibility	of	‘re-educational’	criminal	policies	and	has	disrupted	the	balance	between	vindictive	 impulses	and	rights	protection	 in	 the	phase	of	 sentence	execution.	Current	criminal	policies	 seem	 to	 jeopardise	 the	division	of	powers	characteristic	of	 twentieth-century	liberal	democracies,	radically	transforming	the	mechanisms	that	connoted	them	as	constitutional	governments.	Cynically,	one	should	probably	rejoice	at	the	fact	that	power	seems	finally	willing	to	renounce	the	 mask	 of	 equality	 behind	 which	 it	 has	 always	 hidden,	 but	 perhaps	 what	 we	 call	 (legal)	civilization	 is	nothing	more	 than	a	 set	 of	masks	 that	 everyone	must	wear,	 first	 of	 all	 the	 state	Leviathan.		
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